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The reason of a thing is not be enquired after, till you are sure the thing itself be so. We commonly are at
what’s the reason of it? before we are sure of the thing. 
John Selden, Table Talk (1689)2
Writing in the last issue of this journal, Kris Gledhill gave a broad account of the introduction of
supervised community treatment (SCT) to the law of England and Wales as a result of the amending
provisions of the Mental Health Act 20073. Gledhill argued that the new SCT status, in which a patient
is technically deemed not to be liable to be detained but is liable to recall to hospital, amounts to a less
honest re-labelling of existing practice in using long-term s.17 leave of absence from detention in hospital,
but left off his account with the observation that “it will come down to how the regime is operated in
practice” on its implementation4. Some months after Gledhill was writing, we now have Codes of Practice
for England and (in draft) Wales5, a draft reference guide providing the Department of Health’s
interpretation of its legislation6, and two very useful and detailed legal commentaries by Phil Fennell7 and
Paul Bowen8. Armed with these documents, it is possible to look in some more detail at how the new legal
landscape might be negotiated by practitioners upon its full implementation in November 2008.
I intend here to look at two related areas: first, the actual powers that SCT provides to clinicians,
especially in relation to the administration of treatment, and, second, the relationship of SCT with the
other community powers of the Act, especially the power under s.17 to allow detained patients leave from
hospital. Whether (mindful of the epigraph to this paper) such a focus will enable us to be “sure of the
thing” that is SCT is perhaps doubtful, and we obviously cannot resolve the question of how (or indeed
if) the SCT regime will be operated in practice across England and Wales, but it may help us to think
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more clearly about the possibilities and prepare ourselves to untangle some of the knots established in the
primary legislation. I will conclude with some comments on the potential numbers of patients involved
and whether Scotland’s experience of community treatment orders tells us anything about the likely
implementation of powers in England and Wales. 
The main provisions of supervised community treatment
Supervised community treatment might be thought of as a form of conditional discharge for unrestricted
patients. Just as with conditional discharge, the patient ceases to be “liable to be detained” upon leaving
hospital, but is subject to a power of recall. The following is a brief outline of the main components of SCT. 
Criteria for initiating SCT
Only patients who are detained under s.3 or unrestricted part 3 hospital orders or transfer directions are
eligible for SCT. To make a community treatment order (thus initiating SCT), the responsible clinician9
and approved mental health practitioner (AMHP)10 must agree that the statutory criteria are met. These
criteria are, in summary, that the patient’s mental disorder warrants treatment which is available; that it
is necessary for the patient’s health or safety or the safety of others that such treatment is given, but that
it can be given outside hospital; and that it is necessary that the responsible clinician should be able to
exercise a power of recall over the patient11. 
Conditions
It is a mandatory condition of SCT that the patient makes him or herself available for examination
enabling renewals and second opinion visits12. The responsible clinician and AMHP also must agree at
the point when SCT is initiated any further conditions to which the patient will be subject whilst the SCT
is in force13. The Act gives a very broad discretion over the nature of those conditions14. Any condition
(which may include, for example, attendance at an outpatient clinic or abstention from particular
conduct) must meet the statutory criteria of being necessary or appropriate, either to ensure that the
patient receives treatment, or to prevent harm to the patient’s health or safety, or to protect other
people15. Once the community treatment order has been made, the responsible clinician can amend or
suspend the conditions without reference to the AMHP16, although the revised Code suggests that “it
would not be good practice to vary conditions which had recently been agreed with an AMHP, without
discussion with that AMHP”17. 
The powers of recall and revocation
If the patient breaches a mandatory condition of SCT, the responsible clinician can (but does not have
to) recall him or her to hospital. Otherwise, the responsible clinician can only recall a patient to hospital
9 This is the revised Act’s structural equivalent of a
responsible medical officer. The holder will not necessarily
be a doctor, but could also be a nurse, social worker,
psychologist or occupational therapist. 
10 This is the revised Act’s structural equivalent of a
approved social worker. The holder will not necessarily be
a social worker, but could also be a nurse, psychologist or
occupational therapist (but not a doctor). 
11 For the exact wording of the criteria see MHA 1983 as
amended by the MHA 2007, s.17A(5). 
12 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.17B(3). 
13 Ibid., s.17B(2).
14 See Fennell, P (2008) Mental Health: The New Law ,
p.212.
15 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.17B(2). 
16 Ibid., s.17B(4),(5). 
17 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para
25.41
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if the patient requires treatment in hospital and there would be a risk to the health or safety of the patient
or to other persons if the patient were not recalled for that purpose18. 
Upon recall, the patient can be held for up to 72 hours, by the end of which he or she would have to be
released (returning to SCT status in the community) unless during that time SCT status is revoked.
Technically patients do not regain the status of being “liable to be detained” (or even of being inpatients)
whilst held for up to 72 hours following recall, but to all practical effects it is as if they were so liable: they
cannot leave and may have treatment imposed upon them (see under ‘Consent to treatment upon recall or
revocation’ below). If the SCT is revoked, the patient’s dormant liability for detention is revived, and he or
she will be treated as still subject to the detention powers that he or she had been discharged from (although
for the purposes of renewing that detention power, or for rights of application to the MHRT, the detention
power is treated as though it had commenced afresh on the day that the SCT had been revoked)19. 
Consent to treatment in the community
The treatment of SCT patients who are in the community with psychiatric medication (or ECT) will be
regulated by the new part 4A of the Mental Health Act. This provides a reduced scope for the imposition
of treatment than that available under part 4 in respect of patients detained in hospital. Most importantly,
professionals cannot override the capable refusal of consent to treatment of a community patient who is
over 16 years of age (or the refusal of a Gillick competent community patient of less than 16 years of age)
under the scheme established at part 4A20. As such, the only way to impose medication upon an SCT
patient who has capacity and refuses consent whilst in the community is to recall that patient to hospital.
It will remain the case that patients who are detained in hospital and subject to part 4 powers can be given
medication (but no longer ECT) despite their capable refusal of consent.21
In general terms, the revised Act allows treatment to be imposed upon any SCT patient who has not been
recalled to hospital and who lacks capacity to give consent, provided that it is unnecessary to use force
to administer it.22 However, such force “as is a proportionate response to the patient’s suffering harm, and
the seriousness of that harm” may be used on an incapacitated patient where urgent treatment can be
justified against criteria equivalent to those set out s.62 of the 1983 Act.23
A substantial difference between the two schemes of part 4 and part 4A is the role of advance directives
and proxy decision-makers provided for incapacitated patients under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (i.e.
donees, deputies and the Court of Protection). The scheme applicable under part 4A to SCT patients in
the community allows that proxy decision-makers may consent or refuse to consent on behalf of an
incapacitated community patient, and that valid advance directives must be respected as if they were a
contemporaneous refusal of consent.24 By contrast, a Second Opinion Appointed Doctor (SOAD) will,
as now, be empowered under part 4 of the Act to certify that medication is appropriate and may be given
to a patient detained in hospital, even in the face of a refusal of consent by a proxy-decision maker or
through a valid advance directive, and proxy decision-makers may not consent on behalf of such a
18 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007., s.17E(1). 
19 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.17G. 
20 Ibid., s.64B and 64C (adults) and s.64E (children). 
21 Ibid., s.58. 
22 Ibid., s.64D
23 Ibid., s.64G. The criteria for treatment to be deemed
immediately necessary are if (a) it is immediately
necessary to save the patient’s life; or (b) if it is
immediately necessary to prevent serious deterioration of
the patient’s condition and is not irreversible; or (c) it is
immediately necessary to alleviate serious suffering by the
patient and is not irreversible or hazardous; or (d) it is
immediately necessary, represents the minimum
interference necessary to prevent the patient from behaving
violently or being a danger to himself or others and is not
irreversible or hazardous (s.64G(5)). 
24 Ibid., s.64C(2), 64D(6)
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patient25. The amended Act does allow that (1) a valid and applicable advance decision of refusal in
respect of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) must be respected, and (2) proxy decision-makers under the
MCA can refuse (but not consent to) ECT on an incapacitated detained patient’s behalf26, although such
advance decisions and proxy refusals may be overridden in any emergency where the treatment may save
life or prevent a serious deterioration of the patient’s condition.27
Any ECT treatment of SCT patients who have not been recalled to hospital must be certified by a SOAD,
whether the patient consents to ECT or is incapable of consent. The treatment of any SCT patient with
medication must, after a certain period, be similarly certified (again, whether the patient consents or is
incapable of consent). This period is one month from the commencement of SCT in all cases, although,
if the patient was placed upon SCT whilst still subject to the three month rule applicable to detained
inpatients, and that three month period has longer than a month to run when they become an SCT
patient, then no certificate will be required until the three month period has run its course.
Consent to treatment upon recall to hospital and revocation of SCT
Part 4A only applies to SCT patients when they are in the community. If an SCT patient is recalled to
hospital, the powers of part 4 apply (albeit with certain modifications discussed below), even during the
period prior to any revocation. The most important consequence of this is that a patient’s capable refusal
of consent can be overridden upon that patient’s recall to hospital. Thus recall powers may be used simply
as a short-term holding power allowing for the administration of medication without consent, even if the
responsible clinician has no intention of revoking the patient’s SCT status (although see under The
example of Scotland below). 
The consent to treatment rules regarding recall and revocation appear to be unnecessarily complex, and
although the following is an attempt to explain them with some clarity, it is unavoidably hard work to
comprehend them. 
The revised Act states that a recalled SCT patient is subject to part 4 consent to treatment provisions28,
although s.62A makes certain special provisions that slightly alter the way in which part 4 works in their
case. For example, s.62A(2) provides that a patient who is recalled from SCT (or has SCT status revoked)
is treated “as if he had remained liable to be detained since the making of the community treatment
order” for the purposes of determining the three-month period during which medication need not be
certified under part 429. The obvious (and clearly intended) effect of this provision is to ensure that the
three-month period does not start afresh when an SCT patient is recalled to hospital. If, however, a
patient is subject to his or her original three-month period when recalled to hospital from SCT, or when
his or her SCT status is revoked, there is no requirement that treatment with medication be certified until
that three-month period has expired, and consent of the patient “is not required” for such treatment given
by or under the direction of the approved clinician who is in charge of it30. The same principle, with
rather less justification, applies to any patient who is recalled within the first month of being discharged
onto SCT: the one-month period where certification is not required follows the patient back to hospital,
so that there is no need for certification of treatment whilst it runs its course31. 
25 i.e. under MHA 1983 s.58(3)(b).
26 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007,
s.58A(5)(c)(ii)
27 Ibid., s.62(1A)
28 Ibid., s.56(4)
29 For this ‘three-month period’ see MHA 1983 s.58(1)(b)
30 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.63
31 ibid, s.62A(3)(b)
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Another consequence of sections 56(4) and 62A(2) appears to be that any certificate that had authorised
treatment prior to the patient’s discharge onto SCT regains technical validity upon his or her recall to
hospital. It is not clear that this consequence was anticipated in the drafting of the Act: the Department
of Health appears to have the role of the surprised women in this particular resurrection story32. In the
only reference to this revival of old certificates that I have found in the official literature, the revised Code
of Practice for England advises that 
it is not good practice to use a certificate issued to a patient when detained and who has since been discharged
onto SCT to authorise treatment if the patient is then recalled to hospital, even if the certificate remains
technically valid.33
In my view this statement correctly identifies as “not good practice” the fact that an authority for
treatment dating back to when a patient was detained regains validity upon their recall from SCT. It
might be argued, however, that the “not good” practice was evident in the legislation’s drafting, and that
it is a bit late now to try to make amends with advice upon its implementation. Nevertheless, it is obvious
that any certification of a patient’s consent to treatment (i.e. on what is now Form 38) should not be
relied upon after the patient has been discharged from hospital onto SCT and then recalled under duress:
it is likely that the consent so certified is no longer being given, and at the very least the consent should
be reaffirmed by the treating clinician. Neither, in my view, should any certification that treatment in the
absence of consent was appropriate before the patient was discharged onto SCT be taken as reliable
authority that it is still appropriate after a patient has been so discharged and recalled. Firstly, this is
because such a certificate may well be rather old by this time. Secondly, it is because a SOAD system that
provides any protection for patients should certify only that which is appropriate given the patient’s
specific circumstances and the prognosis of the case at the time of the SOAD visit. In my view, discharge
into the community and recall to hospital are significant events in a patient’s treatment that should be
taken into account when deciding what imposition of treatment is appropriate.
It may be questionable whether the Code of Practice has the legal authority to tell practitioners to
disregard otherwise valid statutory forms authorising treatment, or indeed to require them to do so, on
the basis of “good practice”34. But if the Code cannot protect patients against the revival of long-dormant
certificates authorising treatment without consent, then it may be possible to encourage SOADs to
provide such protection themselves by adding, as a condition to any certificate authorising such treatment
whilst a patient is detained in hospital, that the certificate expires upon the patient’s discharge onto SCT. 
The revised Act also allows that a SOAD authorising treatment for an SCT patient in the community
may, at the same time, authorise such treatment as he or she feels would be appropriate upon the patient’s
recall to hospital. Such a certificate (although technically made under part 4A), provides authority for
the treatment to be given when the patient is recalled, even trumping any old part 4 authorities revived
as a consequence of the recall35. The SOAD would have to expressly state on the part 4A certificate that
it authorises the particular treatment upon recall to hospital, and will be empowered to also specify any
conditions attached to such authority. The revised Code of Practice for England provides the banal-
sounding advice that this power to specify future treatment upon recall should only be exercised where
32 cf. Luke 24:1-4. 
33 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para
24.81
34 On the question of “good practice” setting aside of valid
legal forms generally, see Jones R (2006) Mental Health
Act Manual, (2006) (10th ed) (Sweet & Maxwell), para
1-721 under the note to ‘certified’, where the current
Code of Practice’s guidance that Forms 38 should be
considered to ‘lapse’ when there is a change in responsible
medical officer, is disputed. 
35 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.62A(3) &
(5). 
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SOADs “believe they have sufficient information on which properly to make such a judgment”36. The
Code is here treading lightly upon what may turn out to be very thin ice. 
The draft revised Code was more explicit in stating how this power to authorise future treatment might
be exercised, with its advice that “the SOAD can specify, if appropriate, that an antipsychotic can be
given to the patient on recall without the patient’s consent”37. For some reason this statement has been
excised from the version of the Code that was placed before Parliament. It may be that the drafters of the
Code realised that it raised difficult questions, such as what would be deemed “appropriate”? The
domestic courts have already determined, in response to a challenge that the imposition of treatment to
a refusing patient under the current provisions of the Act breached Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention,
that to be “in accordance with law” such imposition must not only meet the criteria established within
the Act itself, but must also be justifiable as being in the best interests of that patient in accordance with
the common law test38. There are inherent difficulties in providing such justification in advance of the
circumstances in which it might apply. On this basis, Lord Patel of Bradford, the chairman of the Mental
Health Act Commission (MHAC), is on record as saying that “the MHAC will be likely to advise SOADs
to be extremely cautious when considering whether or not to authorise treatments to be given in an
unforeseeable situation at an unidentified point in the future.”39
If the Code of Practice discourages reliance on old but revived certificates of authority left over from
detention, and the MHAC discourages SOADs from advance certification when they see the patients in
the community, where will the authority to treat SCT patients who are recalled to hospital come from?
It seems most likely that clinicians will rely upon the “urgent treatment” provisions in the Act. Being
subject to part 4 of the Act, recalled SCT patients may have treatment imposed upon them that meets
the criteria for urgent treatment set out at s.62(1). A provision mirroring s.62(2) is also applicable to SCT
patients on recall, allowing the continuance without certification of any treatment underway at the time
of recall (but only pending a SOAD visit) if discontinuance is deemed to be likely to cause serious
suffering to the patient concerned40. 
These are broad powers, but not without some problems. It is easy to imagine, for example, clinicians
being reluctant to use either of these powers in preference to authority that might be claimed from a
“technically valid” revived SOAD authority dating back to the patient’s detention. Indeed, the lawful
basis of doing so might be questioned. Furthermore, the draft Code may provide a disincentive to using
s.62, by requiring the recording and monitoring of the justification for its use, with the clear implication
that hospital managers should be on guard against excessive usage41. Clinicians may also struggle with the
expectation that the use of urgent treatment powers should trigger a SOAD visit (or in the case of
s.62A(4), that such use is only valid whilst such a visit is being arranged – “pending compliance with
s.58”42). If the clinician’s intention is simply to pull a patient into hospital to administer a depot injection
of antipsychotic drugs, it may also be intended that the patient is returned to the community long before
any such visit might be arranged. In such cases, it may well be appropriate to arrange for a SOAD to visit
the patient in the community, but such a visit would be for the purposes of part 4A rather than part 4.
Could a patient challenge the use of s.62A(4) on the grounds that “compliance with section 58” was, in
such circumstances, never realistically possible? 
36 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para 24.30.
37 Department of Health (2007) Draft Mental Health Act
1983 Code of Practice, Oct 2007, para 26.7
38 R (on the application of PS) v (1) Dr G and (2) Dr W
[2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin)
39 Hansard (Lords) 26 Feb 2007, Col 1451 
40 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.62A(4)
41 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para
24.37.
42 Ibid., para 24.31
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These thickets of consent to treatment provisions may discourage practitioners from exploring the
statutory landscape of SCT, perhaps especially because of the relative simplicity of the law relating to
consent to treatment for patients given long-term s.17 leave, where part 4 certificates simply follow the
patient out into the community. With this in mind, we now turn to the relationship between SCT and
existing community powers. 
The relationship of SCT with other community powers
Prior to the 2007 Act amendments, the Mental Health Act 1983 already contained a number of potentially
coercive powers over patients in the community, notably: leave of absence (s.17); supervised discharge
(s.25A-J); guardianship (ss.7 or 37); and, in the case of restricted patients, conditional discharge (ss.42,73). 
Conditional Discharge 
The introduction of SCT has no effect on the provisions of conditional discharge. SCT and conditional
discharge provide essentially the same power over patients (i.e. discharge from liability to detention with
a fast-track power of recall), and the choice between the two regimes is simply determined by whether or
not the patient concerned has a restricted status. Only unrestricted patients are eligible for SCT, and only
restricted patients can be conditionally discharged. 
Guardianship
There is a less clear-cut division between patients for whom SCT or guardianship might be considered.
An important and very real distinction between the two regimes is that a patient must be detained under
s.3 or its part 3 equivalents to be eligible for SCT, but there is no comparable threshold for imposing
guardianship43 (although it is the case that a patient who is detained in hospital under the 1983 Act can
be transferred to guardianship with minimum formality44). Government guidance in the revised Code of
Practice for England would seek to make a further distinction: that SCT is intended as a power enabling
quick recall to hospital for treatment, whereas guardianship is a community power intended to focus on
“patient’s general welfare, rather than specifically on medical treatment”45. There is clearly a role for
guardianship in protecting patients from exploitation and neglect, but the Department’s distinction is far
from self-evident. Guardianship also can provide a route to detention under s.3 of the Act and
subsequent treatment powers should these be required46, and has been used to encourage if not enforce
treatment compliance47. Indeed, in previous debates about community treatment powers, the MHAC has
suggested that guardianship provisions could address the needs of the majority of the patient groups
targeted48. The Code further suggests that the choice between SCT and guardianship may rest on
whether the primary agency responsible for the patient’s care package is characterised as health or social
services (with guardianship being the preserve of the latter)49. Such a distinction may seem anachronistic
to combined services. 
43 The criteria for guardianship, as amended by the 2007
Act, will be that the patient is suffering from mental
disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate;
and it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the
patient or for the protection of other persons (s.7(2)). 
44 Mental Health (Hospital, Guardianship and Consent to
Treatment) Regulations 1983, reg. 7.
45 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para 28.6.
46 Mental Health (Hospital, Guardianship and Consent to
Treatment) Regulations 1983, reg. 8(3).
47 See Jones R (2006) op cit, para 1-086. 
48 Ibid., para 1-280 
49 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para
28.3
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Guardianship is used patchily50. It is unfortunate that certain patients with learning disability are still to
be excluded from guardianship provisions (as they are excluded from detention and will be excluded from
SCT) unless they exhibit abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct51. Guardianship will
therefore probably continue to be used mostly as a framework for arranging the care of people with mental
illnesses, predominantly the elderly. It seems likely that those few services who have had cause to
discharge patients from detention under the Act into guardianship (an arrangement that probably
accounts for only a small proportion of guardianship cases) will find reasons to continue to do so in similar
circumstances. 
Supervised Discharge
The implementation of SCT powers will coincide with the repeal of supervised discharge (“aftercare
under supervision”), which was inserted into the 1983 Act’s framework by the previous administration52.
About 600 patients are made subject to supervised discharge every year, although no statistics are
available on the total number of patients so subject at any one time53. The transitional mechanism for
the introduction of the new powers will allow that patients subject to supervised discharge upon its
demise could be transferred to SCT status, although there will be no automatic transfer and such patients
who meet other criteria (i.e. for guardianship, detention in hospital or absolute discharge) may be dealt
with accordingly54. 
Leave of Absence
The relationship between SCT and leave of absence is more complex. Gledhill has described how the
courts have gradually allowed s.17 leave to be extended in duration so that it now provides authority for
long-term community treatment55. The revised Act now includes a definition of such “longer-term
leave”, which is deemed to be any leave under s.17 that is either authorised without specified limit of
time, or is authorised (whether in the initial authorisation of leave or in subsequent extensions of the
period initially granted) for a specified limit of time that exceeds seven consecutive days56. It will be a
requirement of s.17(2A) that longer-term leave of absence under s.17 may not be granted to a patient
unless the responsible clinician “first considers” whether the patient should be dealt with under
supervised community treatment instead57. It seems likely that the policy intention behind this is to
ensure that practitioners do not use longer-term leave when SCT might otherwise be applied, and thus
anticipates resistance from practitioners to the new SCT powers. Whether the statutory construction
achieves that intention is open to question. 
50 See Information Centre (2007) Guardianship under the
Mental Health Act 1983, England 2007, p.3: 16 (12%)
of 133 local authorities accounted for 402 (44%) out of
926 guardianship cases open at March 31 2007. Similar
proportions are reported in previous years. 
51 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.1(2A) and
1(2B). See Bartlett P & Sandland R (2007) Mental
Health Law Policy and Practice, third edition, p. 489-490
on the exclusion of LD patients from guardianship. 
52 MHA 1983 as amended by the Mental Health (Patients
in the Community) Act 1995, s.25A – 25J (repealed
under the Mental Health Act 2007 from November
2008)
53 Department of Health (2007a) Mental Health Act 2007
Secondary Legislation Consultation, p. 167. See
Information Centre (2007) In-patients formally detained
in hospitals under the Mental Health Act 1983 and other
legislation, NHS Trusts, Care Trusts, Primary Care Trusts
and Independent Hospitals, England; 1995-96 to 2005-
06, table 7, p.21 for data.
54 See Mental Health Act 2007 (Commencement No.6 and
After-care under Supervision: Savings, Modifications and
Transitional Provisions) Order 2008 (No. 1210).
55 Gledhill, K (2007) op cit.
56 MHA 1983 as amended by the MHA 2007, s.17(2B)
57 The Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice
restates this requirement, keeping carefully to the language
used in the Act itself, at para 21.9. 
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Indeed, there is a whiff of absurdity in this provision of the law, in that it appears at first sight to be very
prescriptive and yet, as if by some failure of nerve, its actual requirement remains rather vague. What does
it mean, after all, to “consider” something? From one point of view, “consider” is an ordinary word of the
English language and nothing may be inferred from it beyond its ordinary use58. As such, the legal
requirement upon responsible clinicians when they are minded to let a detained patient leave hospital for
more than seven days without granting an absolute discharge may be viewed as nothing more than that
they contemplate mentally and weigh the merits of using either s.17 leave or SCT59. 
However, it has been argued by Bowen that SCT provides better patient safeguards and raises fewer
human rights implications than longer-term s.17 leave60. If this is correct, then the mental scales upon
which a responsible clinician is required to weigh the merits of either regime should tip strongly in favour
of SCT. 
Bowen’s contention is echoed, at least in part, by the Code of Practice, which describes SCT as “a more
structured system than leave of absence” with “more safeguards for patients”61. The Code, as a document
drafted by officials of the Department of Health, understandably is rather coy in pointing out the lack that
is highlighted in s.17 by the requirements and procedures of SCT. Not so Mr Bowen. He suggests the
following contrasts between the two regimes:
1. That a responsible clinician and AMHP must be satisfied that the criteria for SCT are met, whereas
the decision to grant long-term s.17 leave is taken by the responsible clinician alone, without any
applicable criteria at all62. 
2. SCT is subject to provisions for expiry, renewal and discharge, and the patient has the right to apply
to the MHRT to be discharged, “whereas s.17 contains no such safeguards beyond those that apply
to the underlying application for admission for treatment”63.
3. The criteria for recall “are more stringent (if not by a significant degree) than those that apply to s.17
leave”64.
4. SCT patients are, whilst in the community, treated under the new consent to treatment provisions of
part 4A, which do not permit the compulsory treatment of a competent patient, whereas patients on
s.17 leave are subject to the provisions of part 4, which do permit the overriding of a competent
refusal of consent and forcible treatment.65
Further to this, Bowen suggests that SCT is “probably less likely” to violate the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) than does the long-term use of s.17, for the following reasons: 
5. The lack of criteria and procedure noted at (1) above result in s.17 powers that are “arguably” too
vague to meet the requirement that any interference with rights protected by Article 8 (private and
family life) be “in accordance with the law”66; and
58 A version of this argument was suggested from the floor by
Richard Jones at the Cardiff University Law School
conference (‘the Mental Health Act 2007’) of the 15
February 2008. 
59 See Concise Oxford Dictionary: “Consider v.t.:
contemplate mentally; weigh merits of (course of
action…etc)…” 
60 Bowen, P (2008) op cit., paras 5.09-11, 5.89-93
61 Revised Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, para
28.5. 
62 Bowen, P (2008) op cit, para 5.10
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. The criteria for recall from s.17 are that this is
necessary for the patient’s health or safety or for the
protection of other persons: see MHA s.17(4).
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., para 5.90
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6. The lack of stringent criteria for recall to hospital from s.17 noted at (3) above potentially allows for
recall where the Winterwerp criteria (justifying detention upon the basis of up to date medical
evidence of unsoundness of mind) are not met67. 
Some of these complaints against s.17 leave appear to have a rather speculative basis: and Bowen
acknowledges as much in relation to the “human rights implications”68 listed at points 5 and 6. An
implication is not a violation, and even such a skilful and tenacious advocate69 as Mr Bowen might run
into difficulties in arguing, as he appears to do at points 3 and 6, that legal consequences arise from an
insignificant difference in the degree of stringency between two sets of criteria. It would seem to me self-
evident that, if the criteria are essentially the same, they must either stand or fall together. Similarly, it is
not clear to me what practical consequences emerge from the fact, set out at point 2, that the expiry,
renewal and discharge mechanisms for s.17 patients are those that apply to the underlying application for
admission for treatment, whereas such mechanisms for SCT patients are contained within the provisions
of the Act that establish SCT and its administration. It may be that there is a significant difference of
entitlement between the practical effects of such mechanisms, but if so I have not seen it. It is also unclear
how the relatively broad discretion given to a responsible clinician to grant s.17 leave (point 1) fails any
specific requirement of law, given that the patient given leave under these circumstances must still meet
the criteria to remain liable to be detained, and that renewal of such liability will require the agreement
of another professional to the responsible clinician. 
This leaves the differences in consent to treatment provisions between the two regimes raised at Bowen’s
point 4. Some of these differences are undeniably significant: in particular the ability to enforce
treatment, at least in principle, on a capably refusing s.17 leave patient whilst that patient remains in the
community, which is not replicated in SCT provisions. Faced with this difference, alongside the SCT
regime’s complex arrangements for additional SOAD visits and the Code of Practice’s explicit statement
that SCT has more safeguards for patients, a court (or for that matter an MHRT panel) might be easily
persuaded that a patient subject to long-term s.17 leave who appears otherwise eligible for SCT is getting
a raw deal. 
As such, it is quite possible that the contention that SCT has better patient safeguards than s.17 could
have some influence over responsible clinicians’ choice between the two regimes. But if the gravitational
pull of SCT is thus increased, so might be the resistance to it by responsible clinicians who perceive it as
bureaucratic or as a curtailment of their power. Such clinicians may find some assistance in the chapter
of the Code of Practice dealing with the choice between community powers. 
In the Mental Health Bill debates, the Secretary of State for Health (Patricia Hewitt) stated that SCT
was 
“designed particularly for the so-called “revolving door patients”—people who are hospitalised, whether under
compulsion or voluntarily, who respond to treatment, who are released, and who then fail to maintain their
treatment, producing another crisis and yet another hospitalisation.”70
The revised Code of Practice for England, at chapter 28, suggests some “pointers” for clinicians deciding
between leave of absence and SCT, including a table essentially similar71 to that reproduced at Table 1.
In this schema, patients for whom community arrangements are likely to break down, and who are likely
67 Ibid., para 5.91
68 Ibid., paras 5.89 – 91. 
69 Ibid, p.vii: the description is that of Sir James Munby
(High Court Judge). 
70 Hansard (Commons) 16 April 2007, Col 56. 
71 Although I have slightly condensed the phrases and
included two statements (shown in quotation marks) from
the text of that chapter. 
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to require future hospitalisation without consent, are deemed appropriate for longer-term s.17. Patients
for whom the likelihood of community arrangements breaking down is serious but not high, and who are
unlikely to require future hospitalisation without consent, are marked out for SCT. As such, the attributes
of a “revolving door” patient (or any patient for whom there is deemed to be a risk of relapse) can as
easily, if not more easily, be ascribed to the description of patients for whom the Code recommends longer-
term s.17 leave than SCT. Whilst the Code is careful not to appear prescriptive in its guidance over which
power to use, that guidance could be used as an excuse by clinicians who are reluctant to engage with the
new powers. 
Table 1 – Pointers to the use of leave of absence or SCT, from the MHA Code of Practice
(England), chapter 28 
Estimating the likely implementation of SCT
The above discussion has not established any very solid ground upon which to base estimations of the
likely impact of SCT. Indeed, such an estimate must range from anticipating almost no effect upon
implementation (if practitioners ignore the new SCT powers, as they have largely ignored the powers of
supervised discharge, and continue to use leave of absence powers as a community-based power) to
expecting a significant shift in the means by which patients released from detention in hospital remain
subject to compulsion under the Act (if practitioners largely abandon longer-term s.17 leave in favour of
SCT, and/or use SCT as a standard discharge package for s.3 detainees). However, we can identify the
pool of patients whose legal status (if not necessarily individual circumstance) makes them eligible for
SCT, and we can look to the example of Scotland where community treatment orders, although not
identical to SCT, have been in effect from October 2005. 
Section 17 leave Supervised Community Treatment
• Discharge from hospital for specific purpose or
fixed period: “may be useful where the clinical
team wishes to see how a patient copes
outside hospital before making a decision to
discharge”.
• Confidence that patient is ready for discharge
on more than a trial basis: “focus on ensuring
patient continues to receive medical
treatment without having to be detained
again”. 
• Patient is likely to need further inpatient
treatment without compliance or consent. 
• Good reason to expect that patient will not
need to be detained for the treatment they
need. 
• Risk of arrangements in the community
breaking down or being unsatisfactory is high.
• Risk of arrangements in the community
breaking down or patient needing to be
recalled to hospital for treatment is
sufficiently serious to justify SCT, but not so
high that it is very likely to happen. 
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72 http://www.healthcarecommission.org.uk/_db/
_downloads/xtabEngland_mh.xls
73 http://www.healthcarecommission.org.uk/_db/
_downloads/xtabWales_mh.xls
74 Information Centre (2007) op cit (n.52 above), table 4,
p.7, table 1, p.15, & table 7, p.21.
75 Department of Health (2006) Mental Health Bill:
Regulatory Impact Assessment. November 2006, p.55. 
76 Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland (2007)
Community Based Compulsory Treatment Orders under
the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003. www.mwcscot.org.uk
77 Ibid., page 3.
78 Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland (2008) Our
overview of mental welfare in Scotland 2006-07, p.46. 
79 Ibid. 
The number of patients eligible for SCT in England and Wales 
The Count Me In census recorded a population of 8,223 detained patients who were subject to s.3 (or a
relevant part 3 order) in England72, and 1,501 in Wales73 on the 31 March 2006. As such we might
assume a likely ‘pool’ of roughly 10,000 patients who will be broadly eligible for SCT upon its
implementation in England and Wales. Counted over the course of a whole year, that pool may be almost
four times larger. Section 3 powers were applied to 37,777 patients in England in the financial year
2006/07, and at least 470 patients were made subject to relevant part 3 sections74. Of course, not
everyone who is detained under a relevant section of the Act will be a suitable patient to be discharged
onto SCT, whether this is because their recovery is more complete than would justify continuing powers;
or because they never become compliant with a care package; or for any number of other reasons. The
Department of Health has estimated that 2% of such potentially eligible patients will be made subject to
SCT in the first year of implementation, rising to 10% within 5 years75: this implies a starting population
of 200 SCT patients, rising to approximately 4,000 initiations of SCT each year. 
The example of Scotland 
The number of people made subject to community treatment orders in Scotland has shown a steady rise
from their introduction in October 200576. In January 2006 there were 65 patients on community orders
(about 4% of all patients subject to compulsory treatment orders overall), rising to 280 patients (18% of
all patients on treatment orders) at the end of April 200777. Statistics were not available to show the rate
at which people are discharged from community orders, although in the financial year 2006/07, 90 orders
either lapsed or were revoked, whereas 371 new orders were made78. 
There are significant differences between the Scottish legislation and that being introduced to England
and Wales, which clearly limit the extent to which the Scottish experience can act as a model to predict
the impact of SCT. Most notably, in Scotland the community order is free-standing and not necessarily a
power of discharge from detention, although over half (197) of all new Scottish community orders in
2006/07 were effectively discharge from detention in hospital79 (thus suggesting that community
treatment orders upon discharge from hospital account for approximately 9% of all hospital and
community orders made in the second year of implementation). This might suggest that the Department
of Health has underestimated the rate of use for SCT. 
There may be lessons from the Scottish experience in how SCT powers will be used. In particular, it may
be instructive to look at how or why patients are recalled to hospital from community treatment orders
in Scotland. The Scottish Act differs markedly from the SCT regime in that the former provides a specific
power in relation to CTO patients who fail their requirement to attend places of treatment, so that such
patients can be taken, conveyed and held for up to six hours at such places for the treatment to be
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administered80. This is in addition to powers of recall which allow that a patient who has failed to comply
with the requirements of any order may be retaken to hospital and detained there for up to 72 hours in
the first instance81, extendable to 28 days82, if the responsible medical officer has tried to contact the
patient, given the patient the chance to comply, and believes that it is reasonably likely that further non-
compliance would lead to significant deterioration in the patient’s mental health. 
Table 2 shows the use of these powers as reported in Scotland. By the end of April 2007, only nine people
were known to have been made subject to the six-hour holding power for enforced treatment (s.112),
although one patient had been so subject four times, whereas 64 patients accounted for a total of 71
recalls to hospital under the initial 72-hour holding power (s.113), with 54 such recalls leading to a
further 28-day detention (s.114)83. Nineteen further community patients were directly readmitted to
hospital under emergency or short-term detention powers during this period84. 
Table 2 – Recall of community patients in Scotland, 5 October 2005 to 26 April 2007
The apparently scarce use of the six-hour treatment power in Scotland (if it is not simply a reflection of
failure to report its use to the Mental Welfare Commission) may indicate something quite significant
about the use of community powers in general. Although specifically empowered to do so in Scotland, it
appears that professionals may be reluctant to pull patients into hospital under compulsion solely for the
purpose of administering medication by force. There is no direct equivalent of the six-hour treatment
power in the amended Act for England and Wales, but it has been a long-standing assumption that
patients who are made subject to the 72-hour recall power might be held only for so long as is required
for the safe administration of medication without consent before being released back into the community,
and in this sense the recall power encompasses the powers created separately in the Scottish legislation.
Compulsory measure used No. of occasions No. of people
No. of people as %
of all on community
treatment orders
s.112 (six hour treatment power) 12 9 3
s.113 (recall for up to 72 hours) 71 64 23
s.114 (recall for up to 28 days) 54 50 18
s.36 (emergency detention –
up to 72 hours)
3 3 1
s.44 (short-term detention –
up to 28 days)
16 16 6
80 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003, s.112
81 Ibid., s.113
82 Ibid., s.114
83 Ibid, pages 4 – 5 (see table 2)
84 Ibid, page 5, table 2
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85 See, for example, Hansard (Commons) 18 Jun 2007: Col
1199, where the relevant Minister (Rosie Winterton)
objected to amendments requiring SOAD authorisation of
treatment upon recall because that “would, in practice,
prevent a patient from being treated without delay on
recall to hospital, and would thus render recall useless”.
86 See, for example, Boateng P (1998) Mental Health Act
Review – Speech to the Midhurst Seminar (First. Meeting
of the Richardson Scoping Study Review Team): “Non-
compliance can no longer be an option … I have made it
clear to the field that this is not negotiable”
In particular, as we have seen, the consent to treatment provisions for recalled SCT patients explicitly
provide that treatment powers should be available to clinicians immediately upon the patient’s recall85. 
There is, no doubt, much that we have yet to understand about the patterns of CTO use in Scotland, but
the rarity of use of the six-hour treatment power may suggest that the powers given over patients are being
used with more caution, or just with more humanity, than many may have feared. It may be, for instance,
that clinicians who decide to recall community patients to hospital view such action as being such a
serious intervention, or as highlighting such a serious level of concern over a patient’s ability to manage
in the community, that to keep the patient for only so long as it takes to administer an injection does not
seem to be an adequate response. In such cases, practitioners may choose to bring a patient in for
assessment rather than a single forcible treatment. The power to recall for treatment over a maximum of
six hours may also be regarded as too nakedly coercive by clinicians who are concerned to maintain a
therapeutic relationship with their patients. Perhaps such relationships are less damaged by the softer
coercion of persuasion (albeit persuasion against the option of remaining in hospital under detention
following recall from SCT), and as such the powers to impose medication will not, after all, be at the
centre of decisions to recall SCT patients to hospital. It is important to remember that, from a practical
point of view, the continuation of SCT after a patient has been recalled will often rely on regaining that
patient’s compliance with treatment. A patient who continues to refuse to consent to or comply with
treatment upon recall from SCT, even after that treatment is imposed by force, is unlikely to be
considered fit to be discharged back into the community on SCT status. 
There would be no small irony if the hard-won and controversial legal power to impose treatment upon
a patient recalled from a community placement turns out, in practice, to much less of a great clunking
fist than was feared by its detractors, or indeed implied by its supporters86. The power to recall, and to
impose treatment upon recall, may turn out to be only marginally different in effect to the power under
supervised discharge or guardianship to convey community patients to places of treatment and there
persuade them (by fair or not so fair means) into compliance. 
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